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FEDERALISM AND THE MARKET FOR
CORPORATE CONTROL
RICHARD A. BOOTH*
The controversy over how, if at all, to regulate corporate takeovers has
been raging for more than twenty years. And as often as not the question
has been who will do the regulating. Such confusion, is, of course, inher-
ent in the federal system. But it is compounded in connection with cor-
poration law not only because federal law expressly preserves the right of
the states to regulate,' but also because the several stock exchanges have
broad regulatory powers.2 As one would expect, all who have the power
to regulate takeovers and takeover defenses have attempted to use it.
Until 1987 the growing consensus was that the market for corporate
control was distinctly interstate in character, and that only Congress and
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC or Commission) had the
authority to regulate it in any comprehensive way.3 All that quickly
changed. In CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America,4 the Supreme
Court upheld the right of states to restrict takeovers of resident compa-
nies, and in Business Roundtable v. SEC,5 the D.C. Circuit Court of Ap-
peals struck down the SEC's rule 19c-4, the Commission's most
significant effort to curtail a wide range of takeover defenses by potential
target companies, on the grounds that these defenses have the effect of
reducing shareholder democracy.
It might seem, to some observers at least, that the forces of darkness
have prevailed in the war over takeover regulation. Most academic com-
mentators hailed takeovers as a way of keeping management on its toes.6
On the other hand, potential target managers and their advocates saw
* Professor of Law, University of Maryland.
1. Securities Exchange Act § 28(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1988). Interestingly, however, fed-
eral law only preserves the right of the states to regulate securities. It says nothing expressly about
corporation law. Ironically, it is widely argued that state securities law is redundant and could well
be repealed. See genrally Sargent, State Disclosure Regulation and Allocation of Regulatory Respon-
sibilities, 46 MD. L. REV. 1027 (1987).
2. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 6, 15 U.S.C. § 78f (1988).
3. See Booth, The Promise of State Takeover Statutes, 86 MIcH. L. Rav. 1635 (1988).
4. 481 U.S. 69 (1987).
5. 905 F.2d 406 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
6. See, e g., Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management in Responding
to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REv. 1161 (1981).
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takeovers as destructive, short-term strategies that amounted, at best, to
the mere rearrangement of ownership interests and distracted business
from its real objectives.7 To be sure, between the rise of state takeover
statutes and the fall of rule 19c-4 corporate management is much more
secure than it was. But that does not necessarily mean that the reason
things turned out as they did is that the establishment usually wins. It
may well be that both of these key decisions turn out to be eminently
wise-both in terms of setting jurisdictional lines and in terms of sub-
stantive regulation.
I. A SHORT AND CRITICAL HISTORY OF TAKEOVER REGULATION
The story of takeover regulation begins in 1968 when Congress passed
the Williams Act,' thereby extending the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 into the realm of tender offers. Though commentators have often
said that the fundamental purpose of the Williams Act is to assure a level
playing field on which bidder and target management can fight out the
contest for control,9 the truth is that the Williams Act was intended to
discourage tender offers.10
The Williams Act addresses tender offers in two distinct ways. First,
largely consistent with the traditional role of federal securities law, the
Williams Act requires a bidder to make various disclosures in connection
with a bid.II The theory is that something similar to a registration state-
ment ought to be required when someone seeks to buy securities whole-
sale from the public. After all, in the typical share-for-share merger the
surviving company is required to register the stock that is offered in ex-
change for the target's stock. Why should the rule differ in connection
with a cash offer merely because cash is not a security that requires regis-
tration under federal law? The question is supposed to be rhetorical.
Second, the Williams Act sets forth certain ground rules under which
7. See, e.g., Lipton, Corporate Governance in the Age of Finance Corporatism, 136 U. PA. L.
REv. 1 (1987).
8. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §§ 13(d)-(e), 14(d)-(f), 15 U.S.C. § 78m (d)-(e), 78n (d).
(f) (1988).
9. See Schreiber v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 472 U.S. 1 (1985); Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus.,
430 U.S. 1, 26-37 (1977); R. FERRARA, M. BROWN & J. HALL, TAKEOVERS: ATrACK AND SUR-
VIVAL 5-10 (1987).
10. See R. FERRARA, M. BROWN & J. HALL, supra note 9, at 8.
11. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §§ 13(d), 14(d), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d), 78m(d) (1988). Se-
curities Exchange Act Rules 14d-6, 14d-100, 14d-101, 17 C.F.R §§ 240.14d-6, 240.14d-100, 240.14d-
101 (1990).
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every tender offer must proceed. Anyone who becomes an owner of
more than five percent of the shares of a company must notify that com-
pany within ten days.12 If a tender offer is made, tendering shareholders
have the right to withdraw their shares for the first seven days of the
offer, and after sixty days if the shares have not been purchased.'" If the
offer is over-subscribed, the offeror must purchase a pro rata portion of
the stock of shareholders who tender during the first seven days of the
offer. 4 If the buyer raises the offered price during the pendency of the
offer, the higher price must be paid to all tendering shareholders.15
The Williams Act does not work particularly well. Tender offers de-
pend on the bidder finding hidden value in a company. Thus, the idea
that the bidder would disclose its true intentions is absurd. Most bidders
simply state that they are buying shares for investment or in order to
gain control of the target company.16 Few ever really explain why.
Moreover, the idea that shareholders care why someone is offering a pre-
mium for their shares is equally absurd, though they may well care
whether the offeror, or someone else, would offer more. Indeed, even if
shareholders did pay much attention to the reasons behind tender offers,
disclosure would likely backfire. If a shareholder thought that the offeror
had misguided plans for the company, she would probably tender her
shares in order to avoid remaining a shareholder in a poorly managed
company. If she thought that the bidder's plans were brilliant, she might
well be more inclined to hold out for an increase. 7
The bidding rules, too, leave much to be desired. The ten day period
implied in the Williams Act is really quite short. The idea was to dis-
courage the Saturday Night Special, that is, a bid with a very short dura-
tion that forces shareholders to make up their minds quickly or else face
the loss of the offered premium.'" But most bids last longer anyway.' 9
12. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 13d, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1988). See also Securities
Exchange Act Rules 13d-1 - 13d-5, 17 C.F.R §§ 240.13d-1 - 240.13d-5 & Schedule 13D, 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.13d-101 (1990).
13. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 14(dX5), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(5) (1988).
14. Id. § 14(d)(6), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(dX6) (1988).
15. Id. § 14(d)(7), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(7) (1988).
16. See Tobin & Maiwurm, Beachhead Acquisitions: Creating Waves in the Marketplace and
Uncertainty in the Regulatory Framework, 38 Bus. LAW. 419, 434-36 (1983).
17. See Booth, The Problem with Federal Tender Offer Law, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 707, 711 n.12
(1989); Borden & Weiner, An Investment Decision Analysis of Cash Tender Offer Disclosure, 23
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 553, 561, 589-90 (1978).
18. See R. FERRARA, M. BROWN & J. HALL, supra note 9, at 5-6.
19. Virtually all bids now remain open for at least 30 calendar days even though the 20 business
1991]
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Proration also was a nightmare for all concerned. When the terms of a
bid are altered during its course, as they frequently are, the effect is to set
up a new proration pool for each installment of the bid. Thus, an early
tenderer might suffer proration whereas a later tenderer might actually
have all of her shares purchased.
Finally, the five percent notification rule is easily avoided because of
the ten day delay. Thus, a bidder may cross the five percent threshold
and continue to purchase for ten days without identifying himself. This
ten day window of opportunity also renders the highest price rule rather
hollow. The market usually notices increased activity in a stock long
before any disclosure is required. As the price rises, sophisticated traders
buy and sell knowing fully well that it is likely that a tender offer or other
bid is in the offing. The net result is that a large percentage of shares will
already have been concentrated in the hands of market professionals by
the time the offer is announced. In short, the highest price rule will not
protect those shareholders who sold out earlier, if indeed, the rule offers
protection at all.2°
In a remarkably uncontroversial move, the SEC took steps to patch up
many of these defects. With hardly a hint of authority from Congress,
the Commission extended to twenty days the time period during which
an offer must remain open.21 The Commission further required, by rule,
that proration extend throughout an offer,2 2 though here, in a nod to-
wards Congress, the rule was styled as an exemption from the statutory
proration requirement.
Aside from the defects inherent in the Williams Act, bidders and mar-
ket professionals devised all sorts of ways around the Act and the SEC's
rules. Thus the SEC sometimes reacted to these moves with still other
rules that also often extended well beyond anything Congress had actu-
ally authorized. The most notable example arose when Boone Pickens
made an offer for Unocal, and Unocal countered with its own tender
offer. Pickens responded that he would tender his shares to Unocal and
use the money to finance another offer. Unocal then modified its offer,
directing it only to shareholders other than Pickens. The Delaware
day requirement under SEC rules would allow for bids to remain open for as few as 26 calendar
days. Most bids end up being extended still further.
20. See Booth, supra note 17, at 720-24.
21. Securities Exchange Act Rule 14e-l, 17 C.F.R § 240.14e-1 (1990).
22. Securities Exchange Act Rule 14d-8, 17 C.F.R § 240.14d-8 (1990). See Note, The Impact
of Schreiber on the SEC Tender Offer Timing Rules, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 77, 99 (1988).
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Supreme Court found no breach of fiduciary duty inherent in this tactic
and let the offer proceed.23 The SEC then responded with a rule that
forever after would require a tender offer to extend to all shareholders.24
This time the Commission did not escape significant criticism.25
Meanwhile, back in state capitals all over the country, legislators
rushed to enact takeover legislation at the state level. The first genera-
tion of state takeover laws followed the lead of Congress and focused
primarily on disclosure. The states, of course, have concurrent jurisdic-
tion over securities. Both the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 stipulate that the Acts shall not be construed to
deprive the states of their authority to regulate securities.26 The states,
after all, had regulated securities transactions since 1911 when Kansas
passed the first blue sky law.27 Many commercially important states con-
tinue to regulate the quality of securities sold within their borders.2"
Thus, it should not have been surprising that the states also assumed that
they were entitled to regulate the merits of tender offers. Accordingly,
many states' takeover statutes conferred upon the state securities com-
missioner the right to review the fairness of a tender offer, either at his
own instance or upon application by target management.29
First generation state takeover statutes were an undeniable disaster.
They applied on the basis of the target shareholders' residency. Because
any self-respecting company would have shareholders in every state, it
was theoretically possible for the securities commissioners of every state
to review the merits of a particular tender offer. In reality, it was not
uncommon for several states to get involved.3°
The potential for conflicting outcomes is readily apparent. Neverthe-
less, the securities commissioner of any given state could probably only
block an offer to target shareholders within that state. Thus, if nature
had taken its course, it seems likely that a tender offer would seldom be
stopped in any important state. The target shareholders would simply
23. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
24. Securities Exchange Act Rule 14d-10, 17 C.F.R § 240.14d-10 (1990).
25. See, e.g., R. FERRARA, M. BROWN & J. HALL, supra note 9, at 81-83.
26. See supra note 1.
27. See T. HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURrTEs REGULATION 219-22 (1985).
28. See generally Report on State Merit Regulation of Securities Offerings, 41 Bus. LAW. 785
(1986).
29. See, eg., Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982) (holding unconstitutional Illinois stat-
ute that provided for review of tender offers by state securities commissioner).
30. See, e.g., Great Western United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1978).
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not stand for it, particularly if target shareholders in other states were
free to tender their shares for a quick gain. For example, Pennsylvania
recently enacted the most restrictive state takeover statute yet, but many
companies chose to opt out of it because of concern that the law would
prompt big investors to sell their shares and would thus have more of an
adverse effect on the price of the company's stock than any protection
from takeover might be worth.3" After all, if restrictive takeover rules
sufficiently depress a company's stock, the company may become a more
attractive target than it would have been without such protection.
But nature was not allowed to take its course. The Supreme Court
stepped in and invalidated most first generation statutes when it over-
turned Illinois' statute in Edgar v. MITE Corp..32 In a plurality opinion,
the Court held that the Illinois statute violated the dormant commerce
clause. That is, it constituted an undue burden on interstate commerce.
Substantial sentiment on the Court favored the position that federal law
preempted the Illinois statute. Four Justices, led by Justice White, be-
lieved that the Illinois law conflicted with the Williams Act. For exam-
ple, the delay that could result from a target company seeking a state
hearing exceeded the period of time that Congress had specified that an
offer must remain open.33
Notwithstanding the decision in MITE, it is not at all clear whether a
first generation statute, limited to a review of whether an offer should
proceed in a given state, would ultimately constitute much of a burden
on interstate commerce. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court took an en-
tirely defensible position given that the invalidated Illinois act purported
to apply nationwide. If the act had applied only to Illinois corporations
or only to offers made to Illinois shareholders, the result might have been
quite different.34 The MITE decision caused a mad scramble among the
states to devise new takeover statutes that would not offend the Constitu-
tion. Although the states concocted at least five varieties of second gen-
eration statutes, the statutes all had one thing in common: application of
each was limited to companies incorporated in the enacting state and
having a significant presence there.
Second generation takeover statutes operate in widely varying ways.
31. See Wayne, Many Companies in Pennsylvania Reject State's Takeover Protection, N.Y.
Times, July 20, 1990, at Al, col. 1. See generally Booth, supra note 3, at 1693-96.
32. 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
33. Id. at 634-43.
34. Id. at 641-43.
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First, the modified first generation statutes focus primarily on disclosure.
Second, the fair price statutes seek to assure that second-step mergers are
carried out at the same price as first-step tender offers. Third, the control
share statutes sterilize the shares of any bidder acquiring more than a
given percentage of target company shares and give the remaining target
shareholders the right to vote on whether or not to re-enfranchise the
bidder. Fourth, the ill-named business combination statutes prohibit any
merger or sale of assets within a period of three to five years after a bid-
der acquires a triggering percentage of shares.35 Finally, appraisal stat-
utes give shareholders the right to demand cash for their shares when a
bidder gains a controlling block.36
Other generations of state takeover statutes have been spawned in the
meantime, in part by the worry that the federal courts would strike down
the second generation statutes. Some statutes seek to regulate green-
mail.3" Others modify long-standing notions of fiduciary duty so as to
allow management to consider the interests of constituencies other than
stockholders in responding to the threat of a takeover.3" Still other stat-
utes legitimize the poison pill.39 The Federal Reserve Board even got
into the act with a rule interpretation that restrict the use of junk bonds
in raising money to finance the purchase of stock." Further, the Internal
Revenue Code, was amended both to discourage the use of junk bonds
and to penalize greenmail.4
With few exceptions, commentators viewed second generation state
takeover statutes as not only unwise, but also unconstitutional.42 The
party line among scholars of corporation law was that MITE had estab-
lished the proposition that the states could not impede the interstate mar-
ket for corporate control. Thus, ironically, the Williams Act, which was
35. Business combination statutes are oddly named because they also prohibit the sale or dispo-
sition of any significant asset. Indeed, they are aimed primarily at so-called "bust-up" takeovers.
36. See Booth, supra note 3, at 1670-81.
37. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 513(e) (McKinney 1986); 1990 PA. S.B. 1310 (to be codified at 15
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 2571-76).
38. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.59(E) (Anderson 1985).
39. Smith-Hurd § 6.05, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32 para 6.05 (Supp. 1990); 15 PA. CONS. STAT.
§ 2513 (1989).
40. 12 C.F.R. § 207.112 (1990).
41. IZR.C. §§ 279, 5881 (Jan. 3, 1986). It bears noting too that the accounting profession got
into the act with a rule that required any greenmail premium to be charged against earnings. See 18
Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. I, at 19 (Jan. 3, 1986).
42. For a long, but partial, list of articles critical of state takeover statutes, see Booth, supra
note 3, at 1638 n.10.
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originally viewed as unduly restrictive, became a rallying point for those
who opposed state takeover laws. Perhaps it was seen as the lesser of two
evils, or perhaps most commentators simply forgot that they had railed
against it a few years earlier.
The SEC mounted a vigorous campaign to oppose state takeover stat-
utes.43 The reason is unclear. One explanation is that the Commission
was trying to protect its turf, namely, the ability to regulate tender offers.
Another explanation is that the SEC was under the influence of academ-
ics and fellow travelers who overwhelmingly subscribed to law and eco-
nomics, in general, and the Chicago school, in particular. Either way it
seems clear that the Commission saw, as part of its job, the tasks of rid-
ding the world of state takeover laws and company-adopted defenses that
interfered, in its view, with a free market in corporate control. Neverthe-
less, the spectacle of the SEC as a supplicant before the Supreme Court of
Delaware ought to suggest that something was awry.'
Virtually no one expected the Supreme Court to uphold the Indiana
control share statute when it came before the Court in 1987 in CTS Corp.
v. Dynamics Corp. of America." Indeed, some courts went so far as to
hold that Congress had occupied the field with the Williams Act and that
any effort by the states to regulate the tender offer process must fall on
supremacy grounds.46 Though the CTS decision came as a surprise, it
contains little that is really contoversial. The Court merely held that the
states have traditionally had the authority to regulate the internal affairs
of corporations, including the allocation of voting rights, and that the
Indiana statute did just that.47 Interestingly enough, the other varieties
of state takeover statutes were not similarly limited. For the most part,
the other second generation statutes, that is, fair price statutes and busi-
ness combination statutes, and indeed, appraisal statutes, sought to dic-
tate the outcome of takeover contests by regulating the price at which
mergers could be effected or by totally banning them when the board of
directors was not consulted in advance.
The Supreme Court decision in CTS, like the decision in MITE, has
43. See 20 Sec. Reg. L. Rep. (BNA), No. 29 at 1171.
44. For example, the SEC submitted an amicus brief in Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc,, 500
A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985). The Delaware Supreme Court was not impressed and upheld the poison pill
challenged there as a reasonable response to a perceived threat to the potential target company.
45. 481 U.S. 69 (1987).
46. See, eg., Dynamics Corp. of America v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250 (7th Cir. 1986), rev'd in
part, 481 U.S. 69 (1987).
47. CTS, 481 U.S. 87-94.
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since been interpreted as a broad endorsement of state takeover statutes.
Acting on this interpretation, Wisconsin enacted an astonishingly restric-
tive business combination statute.48 It prohibited all business combina-
tions for a period of five years after a change of control when the board of
directors of the target company had not approved the transaction before
the acquirer had garnered a triggering percentage of shares. Unlike the
Delaware statute,4 9 which had come to serve as a model for most states,
no provision in the Wisconsin statute exempted bidders who acquired
eighty-five percent or more of the target company shares. Moreover, and
more extreme, no provision in the statute allowed any Wisconsin corpo-
ration to opt out of its coverage.
The Wisconsin statute was challenged in court and ultimately the Sev-
enth Circuit, completing its tour of three generations of takeover statutes,
one from each of its three contstituent states, held in Amanda Acquisition
Corp. v. Universal Foods Corp. that the Wisconsin statute was constitu-
tional." In an opinion that has become the leading case since the last
statement by the Supreme Court in CTS, Judge Easterbrook read CTS as
a blanket endorsement of state takeover statutes and held in essence that
because the statute in question was a state takeover statute it must there-
fore be constitutional.
While all of this was going on at the state level, and Congress was
wringing its hands at the federal level, the SEC was presented with a
unique opportunity to outlaw a wide array of takeover defenses through
use of its authority over stock exchange rules. The New York Stock Ex-
change (NYSE or Exchange) has long had a rule against listing compa-
nies with multiple-class capitalization, popularly known as the "one-
share one-vote" rule. In recent years, however, several companies listed
on the exchange became fearful of increasing their exposure to takeover
and began to issue low-voting or nonvoting stock to acquire other com-
panies. The most notable examples were General Motors' purchases of
EDS and Hughes Aircraft in connection with which GM issued the cele-
brated Class E and Class H common stock with one-half vote per
share.5 Other companies sought to use nonvoting stock more aggres-
sively by proposing plans of recapitalization in which scattered public
shareholders would be offered nonvoting stock with enhanced financial
48. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 180.726 (West Supp. 1991).
49. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203 (Supp. 1991).
50. 877 F.2d 496 (7th Cir. 1989).
51. See Karmel, Is One Share, One Vote Archaic?, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 26, 1985, at 1, col. 1.
1991]
Washington University Open Scholarship
420 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
rights in exchange for their voting stock.52
The NYSE thus became worried about losing business to other ex-
changes that were more hospitable to takeover defenses, and suspended
the one-share one-vote rule rather than revoke the listing of the offend-
ers. Further, the Exchange sought either to abolish the rule or to induce,
or force, other exchanges to adopt similar rules, with the help of the
SEC's authority over such things.5 3 To make a long story short, the SEC
proposed and adopted what amounted to a new uniform listing rule, rule
19c-4, applying to all exchanges as well as to most over-the-counter
stocks. 4 The rule would have prohibited the listing of any company that
undertakes a transaction that "would have the effect of nullifying, re-
stricting or disparately reducing the per share voting rights of holders of
an outstanding class . . . of common stock" registered under the Ex-
change Act.55 The rule focused in particular on recapitalizations, that is,
modifications of the rights of existing shareholders, but it allowed listed
companies to issue new stock with lesser voting rights, the practice
which, ironically, led to the controversy in the first place.
In June 1990, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals struck down rule 19c-
4 in Business Roundtable v. SEC 56 on the theory that the rule exceeded
the authority granted to the Commission under the Exchange Act. The
court, speaking through Judge Williams, reasoned that the primary pur-
pose of the Exchange Act was disclosure and that rule 19c-4 did not
serve that purpose, despite the Commission's claims to the contrary.57
As the court noted, the Exchange Act is premised in part on the notion
that shareholder voting works.58 Thus, to prohibit the shareholders from
voluntarily entering into a transaction by which they agree to have their
voting power reduced-presumably in exchange for some other benefit-
is more inconsistent with the spirit of the Exchange Act than it is in
furtherance of it. Coincidentally, the Supreme Court's decision in CTS
52. See Gilson, Evaluating Dual Class Common Stock The Relevance of Substitutes, 73 VA. L.
REv. 807 (1987).
53. See Voting Rights Listing Standards-Proposed Disenfranchisement Rule, Exchange Act
Release No. 24623, 1987 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,143 (June 24, 1987) [hereinafter Proposing
Release].
54. See Voting Rights Listing Standards-Disenfranchisement Rule, Exchange Act Release
No. 25891, [1987-88 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 84,247 (July 7, 1988) [hereinafter
Adopting Release].
55. Id.
56. 905 F.2d 406 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
57. Id. at 410-12.
58. Id. at 411.
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provides direct support for this argument. 59
Both CTS and Business Roundtable are widely viewed as losses for
those who sing the praises of the free market in corporate control. In
fact, both may have been important victories.
II. STATE TAKEOVER STATUTES RECONSIDERED
The idea that because the Supreme Court struck down the Illinois stat-
ute in MITE all state takeover statutes are unconstitutional is more than
a bit simplistic. Thus, several commentators argued that state takeover
statutes were protectionist legislation in the sense that they were designed
to favor companies incorporated in the enacting state at the expense of
companies incorporated elsewhere.' ° In other words, the argument was
that state takeover statutes were designed to create a safe haven for do-
mestic corporations. The theory was that the states were simply trying
to keep domestic corporations in the family, and that state takeover stat-
utes would prevent the free flow of control of assets from state to state
and, therefore, would ultimately make resource allocation nationwide far
less efficient than it otherwise would be.
Of course state takeover legislation is protectionist, but not in the sense
that it is primarily motivated by a desire to favor in-state companies at
the expense of out-of-state companies. The simple explanation for state
takeover legislation is that it was prompted by threats to constituent
companies that then sought help from their government.61 Sophisticated
arguments about how a state was in reality trying to have its cake and eat
it too by protecting resident companies from takeover, while allowing
takeover artists to ply their trade as long as foreign companies were the
targets, simply prove too much.
On the other hand, it is not immediately obvious why takeover legisla-
tion arose at the state level and at the federal level. One would have
thought that the same political forces that led the states to adopt legisla-
tion designed to inhibit the takeover process would have operated at the
59. CTS, 481 U.S. at 87-94.
60. See, Romano, The Political Economy of State Takeover Statutes, 73 VA. L. REv. 111
(1987).
61. See id. at 123, 136. While legislators may justify their actions on the grounds that they
protect the local economy, that does not make the claim true. Most legislators probably understand
that protectionist legislation, at least domestically, is likely to be struck down as unconstitutional
and is, in any event, probably unwise because it amounts to subisidizing local business and discour-
aging commerce with the rest of the nation.
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federal level as well. Why were state legislatures susceptible to these
forces when Congress was not? One answer is that Congress is much
more deliberate. That is, Congress is much less likely to act quickly or
on the basis of less than a full hearing of the issues. Another answer is
that Congress is much more susceptible to lobbying by takeover artists.
Still another answer is that state legislators are all the opposite things:
likely to act hastily, and much more susceptible to lobbying by potential
targets.
62
In any event, politics has made some strange bedfellows when it comes
to takeover legislation. Virtually no one other than shareholders, who
are woefully scattered and generally lacking in political clout, was in
favor of takeovers. On the other hand, and mindful of the fact that such
generalizations are dangerous, both conservatives and liberals had some
pretty good reasons for wanting to clamp down on takeover activity.
Conservatives, because of traditional connections to corporate manage-
ment, often opposed takeovers because they represented a direct threat
and because, they argued, takeovers made it difficult to manage with a
view towards long term results. Many believed, quite sincerely, that
short-sighted, quick profit strategies motivated many takeovers. Many
others were concerned about bust-up takeovers-that is, takeovers that
contemplated dismembering the conglomerates formed in the merger
waves of the 1950s and 1960s-and saw such deals as unwise, destruc-
tive, and maybe even sinful.63
Liberals held the view that nothing could be worth the displacement
that takeovers entailed, though it was never clear that, overall, jobs were
lost or lives were ruined on any broad basis as a result of takeover activ-
ity.6r In addition, widespread nervousness arose both about the insider
trading that takeovers seemed to foster and the massive amounts of cor-
porate debt that were being built up in the sinister-sounding junk bond
market.65 In any event, liberals were generally swayed by the folly of
takeovers. In fact, takeovers probably represented a significant opening
up of corporate America to potential entrepreneurs that previously had
62. See id. at 123-26.
63. See Lipton, supra note 7.
64. See Amanda, 877 F.2d at 500 n.5. Ivan Boesky, Michael Milken, and various other con-
victs might well disagree.
65. In a forthcoming article, I argue that one justification for the campaign against insider
trading is the possibility that many deals are proposed as a way of creating opportunities to trade on
inside information and not because of their own merit. Booth, The Paradoxes of Insider Trading,
39-41 (1991) (unpublished manuscript).
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been relegated to climbing the corporate ladder within a behemoth struc-
ture.66 Moreover, takeovers produced massive gains for pensioners and
other not so incredibly wealthy investors. These gains were, of course, at
the expense of companies being publicly held, since much takeover activ-
ity came in the form of going private deals that effectively closed off rela-
tively large corporations from public view.
Whatever the true motivation, no one lost, politically speaking, at the
statehouse where a tough antitakeover statute was enacted. In all likeli-
hood a bit of truth underlies each of the political explanations for why
state takeover statutes were enacted. But it does not necessarily follow
that state takeover laws are inherently suspect. A law proposed for self-
serving reasons does not necessarily render it a bad law. Indeed, who
would bother to propose a law that did not somehow improve someone's
situation? In short, the fact that lobbying efforts of potential target com-
panies prompted the passage of state takeover statutes should be irrele-
vant to any discussion of their merits. But, quite to the contrary, it
became central. Indeed, in one article, the authors went so far as to say
that any discussion of the merits of state takeover statutes was beside the
point, because the real reason such statutes were proposed was to protect
companies incorporated in the enacting state from takeover by
outsiders.61
Looking back, it seems curious that so many commentators would lean
to the results-oriented conclusion that the Supreme Court's decision in
MITE should be read as a blanket condemnation of state takeover stat-
utes. Nevertheless, in Amanda Judge Easterbrook read CTS as a blanket
endorsement of state takeover statutes and held, in essence, that since the
statute in question was a state takeover statute it must therefore be con-
stitutional. The Amanda opinion is remarkable for many reasons. Fore-
most among them is its self-conscious result orientation that has been
viewed by some as tongue in cheek. Some have theorized that Judge
Easterbrook might have been inviting Congress, or conceivably the
Supreme Court, to act.68 In other words, Judge Easterbrook perhaps was
66. The perception that the pieces of conglomerates are worth more than the whole motivates
many, probably most, takeovers. Thus, the usual plan is to "bust up" such organizations into
smaller parts. See Lipton, supra note 7. The not so incidental benefit is a multiplication of smaller
independent companies and keener competition.
67. Johnson & Millon, Missing the Point About State Takeover Statutes, 87 MicH. L. REv. 846
(1989).
68. See Honabach & Dennis, The Seventh Circuit and the Market for Corporate Control, 65
Cai. KENT L. REV. - (1989) (forthcoming).
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trying to write a reversible and, indeed, likely to be reversed, opinion.
What is truly baffling about the CTS decision and its reception, how-
ever, is that few seem to have noticed that the Supreme Court did not
overrule MITE in CTS. No one suggests that the Illinois statute struck
down in MITE would now be constitutional just because the Indiana
statute was upheld in CTS. Indeed, if the two decisions are read as nar-
rowly as possible, it is easy to see daylight between them. In the MITE
case, the Supreme Court struck down a state statute that created the
potential for state-by-state review of a transaction that was interstate in
character.69 The statute posed the obvious danger that any one state
could stand in the way of a transaction found desirable by any other
state. The situation is analogous to one state's attempt under its blue sky
laws to prohibit a corporation from selling its securities not only in that
state but also in any other state. And the blue sky laws had never
worked that way-at least not officially.70
Reading CTS at its narrowest, the Supreme Court said nothing more
than that voting rights are traditionally a matter of state law, and that
the Indiana act was a reasonable response to a perceived problem that
arises as a result of majority rule and the diaspora of shareholders.7"
That is, the Indiana control share statute was designed to alleviate the
problem of coercive tender offers that may arise when a bidder gains con-
trol and then seeks to freeze out the remaining shareholders at a less
attractive price.
On the other hand, such a reading of MITE and CTS ultimately re-
sults in a form of rational basis review for state economic legislation. In
other words, it is a form of the unspeakable: substantive due process.
The statute in CTS was upheld, notwithstanding the burden on interstate
commerce, at least in part, because it furthered a legitimate end.72 It is,
of course, one thing to identify the purpose of a statute and quite another
69. 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
70. See MITE, 457 U.S. at 641-43. Admittedly, an issue of stock that cannot be qualified in
one of the larger merit regulation states such as California or Texas, has little hope of being sold out
since so many investors reside in those states. The phenomenon is similar to the influence that Texas
is sometime said to have over what school books get published.
71. CTS, 481 U.S. at 81-84.
72. Ironically, the end that it furthered, or rather, the evil that it addressed, was one that many
academic commentators had concluded was not worrisome. Although many state takeover statutes,
as well as poison pill defenses adopted company by company, had sought to undo the coercion that
attended the front-end loaded two-tiered tender offer, such offers had largely fallen into desuetude,
and commentators questioned whether they had ever really been coercive in the first place. See
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to overturn it on the grounds that it does not serve that purpose or any
legitimate purpose. Nevertheless, CTS does provide support for the
proposition that a court may look to the purposes of a state takeover
statute when balancing a state's legitimate interests in the regulation of
corporations and deciding whether it should be upheld. As long as the
Court continues to follow a balancing approach to dormant commerce
clause questions, it would seem that whenever a burden on commerce is
found the statute must at least have a proper purpose, and must not be
any more burdensome than necessary.73
Moreover, one may argue that purpose analysis is much more appro-
priate in an area in which there is concurrent jurisdiction. As long as
federal securities law preserves the right of the states to regulate corpora-
tions and securities, it will be unusual for a preemption argument ever to
carry the day. Thus, when a state undertakes to enact or interpret laws
so as to extend its jurisdiction in this area, it would seem that the courts
should be quicker to take a hard look at the state's purpose and
methods.74
Finally, one must question whether it makes any sense even to talk in
terms of burdens on commerce in this area. It seems quite clear that a
change in a state's corporation law will always have a significant impact
on interstate commerce. Thus, any decision that a change in state corpo-
ration law does or does not constitute an undue burden on interstate
commerce necessarily is tied up with the wisdom of the law.75
Grundfest, Two-Tier Bids Are Now a Defensive Technique, Nat'l L. J., Nov. 9, 1987, at 26, col. 1.
But see Booth, State Takeover Statutes Revisited, 88 MICH. L. REv. 120 (1989).
Curiously, one of the arguments made against dual class recapitalizations was that shareholders
might be stampeded into accepting the offer of nonvoting stock with enhanced financial rights by
fear of the consequences of holding out, that is, being left behind in a tiny minority with voting stock
but without the financial incentives that were presumably offered to those who traded in their shares.
The argument relies on the same coercion theory that was supposedly discredited as a justification
for state takeover statutes.
73. See Sroufe & Gelband, Business Combination Statutes: A "Meaningful Opportunity" for
Success?, 45 Bus. LAw 891 (1990).
74. Indeed, preemption arguably works both ways in this area. The concept of federal law as
preemptive of state law is familiar, if difficult. What is less well understood is that state law can
effectively preempt federal law since one of the factors to be considered in determining whether there
is a cause of action under federal law is whether the matter in question is one that is addressed by
state law. See Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
75. As the Supreme Court noted in CTS, an important fiction is at work in connection with
commerce clause analysis as it touches on corporation law, namely, that a corporation exists only
where it is incorporated. CTS, 481 U.S. at 89-93. That is, even though corporate governance is
clearly a matter of interstate commerce, we treat a corporation as if all of its affairs are handled
intrastate. It bears noting that jurisdictional rules are parallel. For example, for purposes of diver-
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While on the surface it would appear that Judge Easterbrook in
Amanda was hewing to a narrow view of his duties as interpreters of the
law, there may be another side to the story. Those who seem most con-
cerned about avoiding the appearance that they are making law may in
fact be the more disrespectful of the democratic process. It could be that
enforcing a law to the letter in a situation in which it turns out to have
absurd consequences is really a way of rubbing the nose of the legislature
in its work. At the very least, it remains open to question whether gov-
ernment would work better with a judiciary that interpreted away obvi-
ous mistakes in legislative enactments or one that simply enforced laws
no matter how unwise or unlikely to have been intended.76
The central question in Amanda should have been what, if anything,
the CTS decision had to say about other varieties of second generation
takeover statutes. In particular, what does it have to say about business
combination statutes, which because of the adoption of such a statute in
Delaware had even by then become the standard for most other states.
Arguably, Judge Easterbrook took a stab at distinguishing the case
presented in Amanda from that in CTS by inquiring, at least in passing,
into the possibility that the contract clause of the Constitution might pro-
hibit a state from altering the right of a shareholder to all the benefits
associated with the shares when they were acquired.77 In fact, this was
one of the weaker arguments that might have been made for striking
down the Wisconsin statute. The problem with the contract theory is
that it has long since been held that shareholders have no vested claim in
any particular set of rights that they might have by virtue of owning
shares.78 In other words, it is perfectly legal and constitutional for the
shareholders acting as a group to amend the articles of incorporation so
as to change the rights that they as shareholders enjoy.79 Moreover, it is
sity jurisdiction, a corporation is a resident of the state of incorporation and the state in which it has
its headquarters. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1988).
76. See Amanda, 877 F.2d at 503. See also Pilon, Rethinking Judicial Restraint, Wall St. J.,
Feb. 1, 1991, at Al, col. 4. Cf. United States v. Marshall, 908 F.2d 1312 (7th Cir. 1990), cert.
granted sub nor. Chapman v. United States, 59 U.S.L.W. 3420 (U.S. Dec. 10, 1990) (No. 90-5744).
77. Amanda, 877 F.2d at 505. See Butler & Ribstein, State Anti-Takeover Statutes and the
Contract Clause, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 611 (1988); Butler & Ribstein, The Contract Clause and the
Corporation, 55 BKYLN. L. REV. 767 (1989). See also Cuddy, Some Observations on the Contract
Clause and the Corporation by Henry N. Butler and Larry E. Ribstein, 55 BROOKLYN L. REV. 847
(1989).
78. See, e.g., Bove v. Community Hotel Corp., 105 R.I. 36, 249 A.2d 89 (1969); REVISED
MODEL BUSINESS CORP. Acr § 10.01, 10.04 (1984).
79. See Amanda, 877 F.2d at 505-06. Although the concept of the corporation as an elaborate
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clear that the state can do the same.80
Other approaches could have been much more fruitful. One of the
differences between the two kinds of statutes is that the business combi-
nation statute does not seek to assure effective shareholder choice. Thus,
to the extent that the central justification for the CTS decision is that the
statute deals with the perceived problem of shareholder coercion, that
rationale is not available for a statute that simply prohibits a business
combination that is not approved in advance by the board of directors.
On the other hand, business combination statutes have a good deal in
common with traditional forms of state regulation over corporations.
The states have traditionally defined the scope of authority of the board
of directors. Under a statute like Delaware's, which allows a business
combination to go forward if the acquirer acquires at least eighty-five
percent of the target company's shares, it can be said that the statute is
little more than a reversion to earlier days when a two-thirds shareholder
standard form contract is an invaluable interpretive tool, it has its limitations. That is, the analogy is
not perfect. For one thing, both the state and a specified majority of shareholders may vary the
terms of this "contract." This is no minor detail. Debt holders, who quite clearly do have a contrac-
tual relationship with the corporation, may not vote under many corporation statutes and under
section 316 of the Trust Indenture Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77 (1988), may not vote to modify any signifi-
cant terms of the contract ("indenture") that governs the obligation that the corporation owes to
them. Moreover, while a shareholder may sue derivatively for a wrong done to the corporation as
long as she was a shareholder at the time of the wrong, a bondholder may not sue derivatively at all,
at least not in most jurisdictions. On the other hand, no limitation exists on the contractual rights of
a bondholder who acquires bonds at a discount after some wrong to the corporation. See generally
ABA Committee on Corporate Laws, Other Constituency Statutes: Potential for Confusion, 45 Bus.
LAW. 2253 (1990).
80. See Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819). It is not,
however, completely clear that a state can alter the contract that shareholders have with their corpo-
ration for any purpose that the legislature may fancy, including the desire to protect resident corpo-
rations from takeover. It could be that changes in state corporation law should be presumed valid
only when they further the function of corporate law as a standard form deal between shareholders,
management, the corporation, and the state. In other words, the ultimate question is whether a state
is utterly free to amend its corporation law as it sees fit or whether the purpose of the amendment
must somehow be tied to traditional notions of what corporation law is about. Practically speaking,
any analysis of whether there is a legitimate state purpose for a given change assumes that the
change has to do with the function performed by the law before the change. So in that sense, the
answer must be that a state is not utterly free for any unrelated purpose to amend a law in a way that
burdens interstate commerce and afortiori cannot amend away property rights. All this assumes, of
course, that the purpose of a statute is relevant for commerce clause purposes which may not be the
case. See Cities Service Gas Co. v. Peerless Oil & Gas Co., 340 U.S. 179, 188 (1950); Sroufe &
Gtlband, supra note 73, at 902-05. Assuming that it is, however, the further question arises as to
who must formulate the purpose. Compare Amanda, 877 F.2d at 503 (noting that there is a big
difference between what Congress enacts and what it supposes will ensue) with Marshall, 908 F.2d
1322-24 (court may uphold federal statute if it serves any proper purpose court may conceive).
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vote was typically required to approve any merger. If the states could
reduce the required percentage from two- thirds to a bare majority, why
should they not now be able to increase the required majority back up to
eighty-five percent under limited circumstances?81
Moreover, there is a sense in which a control share statute is less de-
fensible in the face of federal tender offer legislation than is a business
combination statute. Federal law thoroughly regulates disclosure in con-
nection with the exercise of corporate voting rights.82 And to some ex-
tent federal law regulates the substance of voting rights insofar as
shareholders must now be given the opportunity to vote separately on
whatever issues are likely to arise at a meeting of the shareholders.
While it might be argued that the line-item proxy, and indeed the right to
compel management to cast a vote contrary to its own position, are noth-
ing more than matters of disclosure, such a characterization is twisted at
best.8 3 On the other hand, until recently at least, the Commission has
never attempted to enforce particular kinds of voting rights.8" Thus, in a
situation in which a shareholder would have no vote anyway, or in which
a shareholder's vote could not possibly count-because an outright ma-
jority is controlled by a single individual or group-neither Congress nor
the Commission has ever gone farther than to require disclosure of infor-
mation as would be required if proxies were being solicited.85 That is,
until recently there has never been any attempt to force a corporation to
have or keep any particular set of voting rights. Nevertheless, the fact
remains that federal legislation has invaded the area of voting rights
more deeply than it has any other substantive area of corporation law.
Thus, it could be argued that business combination statutes occupy an
81. Indeed, mergers once required the unanimous vote of the shareholders. Appraisal rights
were the quid pro quo for dropping that requirement. See Weiss, The Law of Take Out Mergers: A
Historical Perspective, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 624 (1981). But there is no reason to think that even that
arrangement could not be undone. See Amanda, 877 F.2d at 505-09.
It might also be argued that the board has traditionally had plenary power over decisions to sell or
liquidate the company in that under most corporation statutes.such transactions may be undertaken
upon board recommendation. See generally Johnson & Siegel, Corporate Mergers: Redefining the
Role of Target Directors, 136 U. PA. L. REv. 315 (1987). On the other hand, the ability of the
shareholders in effect to override the decision of the board not to sell the company is rather like a
derivative suit, that is, a last-ditch check on the ability of the board to run the company in a way that
the shareholders find offensive. See generally A.L.I., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE,
Introduction to Part VI, Reporter's Note, Tent. Draft No. 8 (1988).
82. See Business Roundtable, 905 F.2d at 411-14.
83. See id.
84. The recent example is rule 19c-4 itself.
85. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 14c, 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c) (1990).
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area that is more protected from federal intervention than the control
share statutes upheld in CTS.
Ultimately, the distinction between the control share statute and the
business combination statute, however, is that the control share statute is
designed to further shareholder choice, whereas the business combina-
tion statute is designed to avoid it. Moreover, business combination stat-
utes passed on a state-by-state basis are arguably motivated by a desire to
prevent control of the corporation from being transferred outside the
state. As such, business combination statutes raise at least the question
whether they constitute an excessive burden on interstate commerce. If
it is possible for a state to cure an identifiable evil with a less drastic piece
of legislation, then it would seem that the burden created by a more dras-
tic piece of legislation, at least if it is placed on interstate commerce, is
undue.86 The problem thus becomes identifying the evil to be remedied.
Control share statutes focus on shareholder's coercion and protecting the
right of shareholders to decide the ultimate disposition of their company.
Business combination statutes focus instead on the ability of directors to
remain in control long enough to follow through with their programs.
The problem with the business combination statute, however, is that
while it accomplishes its goal, it also permanently protects incumbent
management. Arguably then the business combination statute effectively
insulates the corporation from challenge by any party, whether within
the state or without the state.8 7
Finally, in thinking about whether state takeover laws are wise or con-
stitutional, it may be useful to think of analogous questions. For exam-
ple, would it be constitutional for a state to declare that some sort of
good or asset that had been freely tradeable could no longer be sold or
transferred, either within the state or to outsiders? Or could a state de-
clare that primogeniture would henceforth be the only means by which
to transfer land? 88 More to the point, could a state enact a law prohibit-
86. Cf Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 370 Mass. 842, 353 N.E.2d 657 (1977) (cor-
porate action disfavoring minority shareholder in close corporation must be supported by business
purpose and must not be any more harmful to minority interests than necessary); Jones v. H.F.
Ahmanson & Co., I Cal. 3d 93, 81 Cal. Rptr. 592, 460 P.2d 464 (1969) (same in context of publicly
held corporation).
87. See generally Sroufe & Gilband, supra note 73.
88. It bears noting that the rule against perpetuities may well be founded on the idea that things
of value ought to be capable of being bought and sold at least eventually. See Dunbar v. Radfield, 7
Cal. 2d 515, 61 P.2d 744 (1936) (rule against perpetuities does not apply to business trust since rights
therein vest immediately and may be freely alienated).
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ing any company incorporated there from re-incorporating in another
state? 9 Clearly such statutes would not discriminate against non-resi-
dents since they would equally affect residents. On the other hand, the
flow of assets in interstate commerce would clearly be substantially af-
fected. Admittedly, the analogy is not perfect since under a business
combination statute assets may continue to be sold when the sale is ap-
proved by the board of directors. But given that the board of directors
has no ownership interest in the asset and that shares represent the entire
ownership interest, the analogy is not far wrong. Moreover, to confer the
right to decide when a thing of value may be sold and to dictate the
specifics of the decision are two different things. In other words, state
action is one thing, while corporate action is quite another. Thus, it is
clearly relevant that the Wisconsin statute in Amanda did not allow for a
target company to opt out-though a company could always re-incorpo-
rate elsewhere-but is it enough to overturn it?
At the very least, it seems clear that the ability to transfer an asset is
part of its value over and above its inherent value. Thus, impairing the
right to transfer the asset arguably constitutes a taking by the state.90
The view has often been expressed that shares cannot legally be made
nontransferable and that only reasonable restrictions on tranfer will be
tolerated.91 Though such assertions have usually been aimed at corpora-
tions seeking to freeze their shares in the hands that held them, perhaps
the idea that a share must be transferable, unless good reasons exist for it
not to be, is more fundamental.
Finally, what difference does it make, if any, that federal law is seen in
some respects as a gap filler? A sort of reverse preemption doctrine ap-
plies when deciding whether to imply a federal cause of action under an
ambiguous statute. The courts have quite clearly held that one impor-
tant factor in deciding whether there is a federal cause of action is
whether the matter is one traditionally relegated to state law.92 More-
89. See Allenberg Cotton Co. v. Pittman, 419 U.S. 20 (1974); Amanda, 877 F.2d at 505.
90. See Amanda, 877 F.2d at 505. Indeed, the modem trend toward recognizing a distinction
between closely held and publicly held corporations is based on the fact that minority shareholders
in a close corporation are exposed to significantly greater risk because they cannot easily sell their
shares. See Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 367 Mass. 578, 328 N.E.2d 505 (1975).
91. See, eg., W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, CORPORATIONS 421 (6th ed. 1988).
92. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1976). On the other hand, congressional silence is not necessarily
dispositive. Congress ought to be able to decide affirmatively to do nothing and not to have the
states interfere, particularly where, as here, the decision may be to rely on a vigorous interstate
market as a substitute for regulation.
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over, this doctrine has been applied more often in connection with fed-
eral securities law than it has in perhaps any other context.93 While
there are no firm answers to these questions, they suggest that something
is wrong with business combination statutes.
III. TAKEOVER REGULATION BY THE EXCHANGES
Although the Business Roundtable case will no doubt come to be cited
for the proposition that rule 19c-4 infringed on an area of law that is left
to the states, the case does not exactly say that. Indeed, it would be more
remarkable if the case did say that since, in effect, such a rationale would
amount to preemption of federal law by state law. What the court did
say was that the Exchange Act focuses on disclosure, and that although
one might argue that one reason for encouraging disclosure in connection
with shareholder voting is to ensure shareholder democracy, such an ex-
planation is, as Judge Williams pointed out, overbroad.94 Admittedly,
the court further reasoned that if the Commission had the authority to
regulate the use of nonvoting stock by virtue of its authority over listing
standards, it would have authority over all aspects of corporate govern-
ance.9" In order to uphold the rule, there must be, as the court called it,
a "firebreak" somewhere that delineates the areas left to state regula-
tion.96 The burden, however, was on the Commission to show where the
firebreak was. The alleged unique historical background of the one-share
one-vote rule was not enough.97 Although the court here comes closer to
saying that the reason why rule 19c-4 must fall is that voting rights are
the province of the states, again it does not quite do so. It only says that
assuming the SEC is not entitled to take over all of corporate governance,
the SEC must point to the limits of its jurisdiction.9"
93. See, eg., Transamerica Mort. Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979).
94. Business Roundtable, 905 F.2d at 411-14.
95. Id. at 412.
96. Id. at 413.
97. Id.
98. Of course, a surface tension exists between resort to purposes in connection with rule 19c-4
and the methods employed in connection with statutes at both the federal and state level. To put it
simply, any consideration of purposes in connection with a statute is questionable because it suggests
that the court is substituting its judgment for that of the legislature. Needless to say, one difference
between the cases is that an agency, such as the SEC, is an agency and a legislature is a legislature.
A legislature, whether Congress or at the state level, does not need to justify its actions except
minimally. Thus, the courts will bend over backwards to find a legitimate purpose for a legislative
act even if the legislature has failed to specify one. See United States v. Marshall, 908 F.2d 1312,
1325 (7th Cir.), cert. granted sub nor. Chapman v. United States 59 U.S.L.W. 3420 (U.S. Dec. 10,
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All of the foregoing notwithstanding, the decision provides two other
rationales that are much murkier and possibly much more important.
One stems from the curiosity that the Exchange Act appears to com-
mand in section 6(b)(5) that an exchange, as a self-regulatory organiza-
tion (SRO) adopt only rules that further the purposes of the Exchange
Act.9 9 As Judge Williams points out, read literally this section seems to
imply that if an exchange rule is proper for the exchange to have then it
is also necessarily proper for the SEC to tinker with it, because it must by
definition be a rule that furthers the purposes of the Exchange Act.1"
Judge Williams responded quite properly to this argument, which ap-
pears to have been raised sua sponte, with the observation that some ex-
change rules have the status of substitutes for law, and other rules are
simply rules. 101 In other words, the fact that the exchanges and the Na-
tional Association of Securties Dealers have been deputized as SROs
1990) (No. 90-5744). An administrative agency, on the other hand, can have no more authority than
is delegated to it assuming, of course, that it is even legal for the legislature to delegate its authority.
On the other hand, a statute has little if any meaning in isolation from its purpose and application.
As Wittgenstein put it, no rule can apply itself. Thus, what a statute means and how it will apply
necessarily is left to the administrative agencies and the courts who have little guidance in interpret-
ing a statute other than the effect it is intended to have. But if that is the job of a judge, there can be
little doubt that when the straightforward language of a statute runs counter to its avowed or appar-
ent purpose, the judge should favor an application that makes sense over one that does not, at least
where the confusion is understandable.
99. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 6(b)(5), 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b)(5) (1990). It should thus be
noted that rule 19c-4 was a meta rule, that is, a rule about what sort of rules an exchange must have.
In form, this is an admirably restrained approach to the matter: the SEC did not specify a particular
rule, but rather, in effect, ordered the exchanges to come up with listing rules consistent with the
goals set forth in the SEC rule.
It is, in a way, curious that rule 19c-4 only applied to changes in voting rights. Although a rule
that purported to prohibit nonvoting stock would have been a much more obvious incursion into the
traditional realm of state law, the SEC, in theory, could have justified such a rule on the same
grounds that supported the rule that was proposed, namely the mandate to protect shareholder
democracy. Nevertheless, by proposing a rule that froze voting rights where they stood, the SEC
revealed a tendency simply to oppose change. The campaign against state takeover statutes was
disturbingly similar. In essence, the SEC sought to freeze state law where it stood at a time when
federal lawmakers were stymied in their efforts to enact new takeover legislation. It is, of course,
unfair to attribute naked fear of change or a petty, misery-loves-company attitude to the Commis-
sion. Its campaign in connection with takeovers was no doubt prompted by a sincere belief that
takeovers were good and that they should be encouraged with whatever tools were at hand. But
whatever the real reason for the SEC's approach to takeover regulation, the whole story suggests
that the states remain the appropriate regulators. The incredible array of rules that has emerged
from the states, together with the sorry Williams Act and the near paralysis that has plagued Con-
gress, indicate that here at least the idea of the states as legislative laboratories is at work and that
Congress suffers from some sort of public choice malaise.
100. Business Roundtable, 905 F.2d at 414.
101. Id. at 414-15.
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does not necessarily mean that every rule or decision must be viewed as a
substitute for law. Thus, the section must be read as referring only to
those rules that occupy a place in the system as a substitute for legal rules
that otherwise might be imposed from without. Or as Judge Williams
put it, some rules have the effect of preempting state law, and others do
not.10 2 Of course, in order to determine which is which we must refer to
the purposes of the Exchange Act, which brings us back to disclosure.
Judge Williams' explanation is absolutely correct, but it demonstrates
the sorry state of the Exchange Act, in particular, and statutory law, in
general. Clearly, nothing in the text of the Exchange Act says that the
rules referred to in section 6(b)(5) are only certain kinds of rules. The
issue of the status of SRO rules is not a new one. Indeed, it has come up
often, particularly in cases in which disgruntled investors seek to main-
tain suit in federal court on a cause of action that may not rise to the
level of fraud. One common tactic in such situations is to assert that the
defendant, who is typically a broker-dealer, has violated some SRO rule
intended to benefit investors. 103
The obvious question is whether this brouhaha is just a bunch of law-
yers arguing over jurisdictional niceties that ultimately make little differ-
ence in the real world. It is not. To see why, it is necessary to take a
hard look at the third and last reason given for the Business Roundtable
decision. It involves the meaning of the 1975 amendments to the Ex-
change Act, which broadly mandated that the SEC take steps to "facili-
tate the establishment of a national market system for securities."'" One
of the avowed purposes of these amendments was to assure fair competi-
tion among broker-dealers and among exchanges. 105 The Commission
thus argued that the 1975 amendments, which also gave it authority to
mandate many kinds of trading rules, gave it authority to prevent the
exchanges from engaging in what Judge Williams aptly described as a
"6race to the bottom" in listing regulations.106
102. See id. at 415.
103. See, ag., Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co., 358 F.2d 178 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385
US. 817 (1966); Lange v. H. Hentz & Co., 418 F. Supp. 1376 (N.D. Tex. 1976). But see Carpenter
v. United States, 484 U.S. 19 (1987). See also Gordon v. New York Stock Exch., 422 U.S. 659
(1975); Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341 (1963).
104. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 11A(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78k-1(a)(2) (1990).
105. See Business Roundtable, 905 F.2d at 415.
106. Id. The reference, of course, is to the landmark law review article by the late William Cary
in which he criticized the idea of state corporation law because of the competition that tends to arise
to attract corporations from other states by offering ever more lenient laws. Cary, Federalism and
Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974). See also Fischel, The Race to
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As Judge Williams points out, the Commission adopted a curious
reading of the 1975 amendments.10 7 If the amendments were meant to
increase competition, how is it that they authorize the Commission to
stop competition by promulgating a rule that mandates uniformity? To
some this argument may sound petty. It depends on whether one tends,
naturally or politically, to have confidence in markets. In all fairness, the
Commission may have had a point. If we are going to depend on SROs
to keep their own houses in order and to save the government the worry
and expense of hands-on regulation and enforcement, we should at least
monitor the performance of the SROs to see that the situation does not
turn into one of foxes guarding the chicken coop. Moreover, if a partic-
ular practice clearly becomes undesirable, why not go ahead and impose
a rule against it? Why take the risk that "destructive competition" might
crop up and leave us worse off? In short, if a law represents a marginal
improvement in welfare, why not enact it?
The simple answer is that law cannot do everything. Clearly, law is
much better at prohibition than at command and control. 10  More to the
point, situations may arise in which the cost of a rigid and uniform rule
exceeds the benefit. Some matters, even if they are capable of being regu-
lated, are better left to the free market. Indeed, the burden should be on
the proponent of a law to prove that it will amount to a net improvement
over no law at all.
Much can be said for stock exchange regulation of takeovers. Indeed,
in some countries, such as Great Britain, the exchanges are the primary
regulators of such matters."°9 The former New York Stock Exchange
rule against multiple classes of common stock with different voting rights
is, or was, a prime example of the unique place of the exchanges in the
regulatory scheme. Neither federal nor state law limits the number of
classes of stock or differences in voting rights. The idea behind federal
law is that as long as the differences are disclosed, investors can decide
for themselves whether to buy or sell.110 The idea behind state law, on
the Bottom Revisited: Reflections on Recent Developments in Delaware's Corporation Law, 76 Nw.
U.L. REv. 913 (1982).
107. Business Roundtable, 905 F.2d at 416.
108. See Booth, Self-Regulation in a Democratic Society, 50 J. AIR L. & CoM. 491, 509-12
(1985).
109. See generally DeMott, Current Issues in Tender Offer Regulation: Lessons from the British,
58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 945 (1983).
110. See Schreiber v. Burlington N., Inc., 472 U.S. 1 (1985); Business Roundtable, 905 F.2d at
411-14.
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the other hand, is that the corporation should be a flexible vehicle, and
that agreements among shareholders to divide up the right to control
ordinarily should be enforced. 1 ' There is nothing mistaken about either
policy. Nevertheless, an exchange has good reasons to prohibit limited
voting rights stock. If such stock is permitted, investors must inform
themselves about what rights they acquire in buying a stock. By elimi-
nating potential differences in the bundle of rights represented by a share
of stock, an exchange can make equity capital available at the lowest
possible cost. In short, by standardizing shares somewhat, exchange
rules can bring buyers and sellers of equity together more efficiently.
In the absence of a central reputational agency like an exchange,
standardization and its economies might not arise. 1 2 Even if companies
seeking the cheapest possible capital were to forgo differential voting
111. See, e.g., Galler v. Galler, 32 Ill. 2d 16, 31, 203 N.E.2d 577, 586-87 (1964).
112. See Booth, supra note 17, at 752-61; Macey & Kanda, The Stock Exchange as a Firm: The
Emergence of Close Substitutes for the New York and Tokyo Stock Exchanges, 75 CORNELL L. REV.
1007, 1023-24 (1990). See also Fischel, Organized Exchanges and the Regulation of Dual Class
Common Stock, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 119 (1987). The idea of an exchange as a reputational interme-
diary was not entirely lost in connection with the SEC's consideration of rule 19c-4. It was sug-
gested that if a particular voting rule turned out to be desirable, then it would attract issuers to the
exchange that offered it, and that marketplace competition would lead the exchanges to adopt the
appropriate rules. See Proposing Release, supra note 52, at 88,779 n.86. The Commission dismissed
the argument with the reply that managers do not always do what is best for their companies, while
at the same time asserting that any rule adopted should leave room for competition among the
exchanges, but only in the areas of price and service and not in the provision of safe havens from
takeover. Id. Disagreement also arose as to whether listing on an exchange, or on a particular
exchange, affects stock prices. See Proposing Release, supra note 52, 88,773 & n.50 (summarizing
studies indicating that listing and delisting do not result in gains and losses in share prices). Com-
pare Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace Inc., 744 F.2d 255, 268-69 (2d Cir. 1984) (delisting constitutes
irreparable harm for purposes of granting injunction) with Gearhart Indus., Inc. v. Smith Int'l, Inc.,
741 F.2d 707, 725-26 (5th Cir. 1984) (contra). None of this is dispositive of the idea that listing
categories could generate real gains, however, since, as the SEC itself noted, evolution in the trading
market has proceeded at such a rapid pace over the past twenty years that most studies are outdated.
See Proposing Release, supra note 52, at 88,773-74 n.50. Moreover, recent studies indicate that
stocks which are included in the Standard & Poors 500 enjoy an immediate and permanent gain
presumably as a result of being associated with the other 499 stocks. See Schleifer, Do Demand
Curves for Stocks Slope Down?, 41 J. FIN. 579 (1986). See also Booth, Discounts and Other Myster-
ies of Corporate Finance, 79 CALIF. L. REV. -_ (1991) (forthcoming); Kraakman, Taking Discounts
Seriously. The Implications of "Discounted" Share Prices as an Acquisition Motive, 88 COLUM. L.
REV. 891, 898-99 (1988); Stout, Are Takeover Premiums Really Premiums? Market Price, Fair
Value, and Corporate Law, 99 YALE L.J. 1235 (1990). While this gain no doubt arises at least in
part because investors and traders depend on the Standard & Poors 500 to formulate portfolios thus
generating more demand for the included stocks, that is precisely the point. There is no reason to
believe that the same would not hold true for stock exchange listing categories if they reliably repre-
sented the unique characteristics of the included companies. Since the exchanges have more or less
abdicated this function in recent years, if they ever really performed it, there is no reason to expect
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rights, it would still be necessary for investors to check. Thus, a modi-
cum of standardization allows capital to be raised at lower cost than in a
less regulated market. This is not necessarily to say that the former
NYSE rules were the best possible rules, but rather that only an ex-
change is in a position to adopt such rules because of the conflicting mis-
sions of federal and state law. In other words, exchange listing, including
the package of rules that go with it, is a product. Indeed, companies pay
considerable sums for it. Why else would the exchanges ever have both-
ered to impose their own quite detailed and typically more onerous cor-
porate governance rules on listed companies? And why would listed
companies have willingly complied?113 It is, in short, only natural that
different exchanges have different rules.
Moreover, the exchanges are probably in the best position to regulate
tender offers. Arguably, tender offers are more like a form of trading
than the proxy contests on which their regulation under the Williams
Act is based.114 The implicit object of a tender offer is to determine at
what price control of the target company may be bought. In other
words, a tender offer is not simply an all-or-nothing contest to determine
who should manage the target. 115 Indeed, much, if not all, of the contro-
versy surrounding coercive offers and entrenching defenses-which is to
say virtually all of the controversy surrounding tender offers-reduces to
questions about whether the market is allowed to function freely and
without distortion to establish a fair price for control.1 16
existing studies to show a significant price effect associated with listing on an exchange or on a
particular exchange.
113. See Macey & Kanda, supra note 108, at 1009.
114. See Cohen, Address on Proposed Legislation to Regulate Tender Offers before the American
Society of Corporate Secretaries, Inc., Colorado Springs, Colo., June 28, 1966, in V. BRUDNEY & M.
CHIRELSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATE FINANCE 850, 850-52 (3d ed. 1987).
115. See Booth, Management Buyouts, Shareholder Welfare and the Limits of Fiduciary Duty,
60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 630 (1985).
116. The prevailing view among academics is that because the stock market is efficient, share-
holders in a freely functioning market for corporate control would tender their shares for a very
small premium over market price. In other words, any premium is enough. Needless to say, if that is
true, then there is less reason to think that the stock exchanges ought to regulate contests over
control. But the efficient market does not necessarily imply that any premium is enough. It is
entirely possible that shareholders hold differing opinions about the value of a given share of stock,
even if ordinarily they would not act on those opinions by betting inordinate amounts of their invest-
ment funds on any one stock in the absence of an unusual circumstance, such as a tender offer, that
calls upon them to make an investment decision on the basis of company-specific valuation rather
than portfolio-oriented valuation. In other words, there is every reason to believe, at least in the
context of a tender offer, that demand curves for stock, like demand curves for most other commodi-
ties, slope downward. If so, the idea that a tender offer ought to be seen as an auction is appealing.
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In addition, exchange rules presumably are less formal than statutes,
or SEC rules, or indeed case law, and presumably may be applied more
flexibly, at least in theory.1 17 Since there is reason to think that certain
kinds of takeover defenses are appropriate for certain kinds of compa-
nies, it may well be vital to permit a regulatory system that allows differ-
ent kinds of companies to choose different packages of takeover rules.
Professor Gilson has suggested that the kind of takeover defenses that
are appropriate for a company may depend on the company's stage of
development. 18 A mature company with little need for further access to
the equity market likely will have higher agency costs than a growing
company that needs additional, higher-risk capital. Management in a
growing company will have every incentive to please its shareholders
whether or not the shareholders have a vote. Thus, a recapitalization
that offers most public shareholders a financially attractive package of
nonvoting securities is not likely to be abusive, and the price of the com-
pany's stock is not likely to fall when such a recapitalization is proposed.
Conversely, a company that has no need for additional equity capital and
thus has fewer incentives, other than the threat of takeover, to induce
management to keep the price of its stock high, disserves its shareholders
by such a recapitalization and will likely see the price of its stock drop as
a result of the proposal or will find that the value of the securities that
must be offered to induce sufficient participation will be prohibitively
high. Such a company thus would be better advised to undertake a man-
agement buyout in which the shareholders escape more or less com-
pletely from the agency costs associated with a mature firm. As
Professor Gilson points out, the fact that both strategies can be mutually
beneficial, depending on the characteristics of the company in question,
indicates that both should be legal. The danger, of course, is that if both
Downward sloping demand implies that there is no single fair price for a share of stock. Rather,
stock is valued along a continuum: the shareholder demand curve. Since there is no single fair price,
there is no sense in focusing regulations on a substantive quest for it or on an effort to provide
investors with quantitative protections. A sensible regulatory scheme instead will seek to insure that
the market for control works as smoothly as possible. With that goal in mind, the stock exchanges
would seem to be the most likely regulators of takeover contests, since no institution other than the
stock exchanges is concerned primarily with the smooth and efficient functioning of the trading
process itself. See generally Booth, supra note 17; Booth, supra note 108.
117. See Adopting Release, supra note 53, passim; Proposing Release, supra note 52, at 88,777,
88,782-83. See also Langevoort, Statutory Obsolescence and the Judicial Process: The Revisionist
Role of the Courts in Federal Banking Regulation, 85 MICH. L. REV. 672 (1987). Cf. Business
Roundtable, 905 F.2d at 414-16.
118. Gilson, supra note 52, at 841.
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options remain legal, mature companies will take advantage of a strategy
appropriate for growing companies as a simpler and cheaper way of insu-
lating management from the threat of takeover.119
Viewed in this light, it is easy to see why the NYSE might have had a
rule different from other exchanges. If most of the companies whose
stock is traded there are mature companies-as indeed they are-then a
rule that precludes them from entering into inappropriate, albeit per-
fectly legal, transactions makes a good deal of sense. It is somewhat
tougher to see that abolishing the rule and setting up uniform rules for all
exchanges might well have represented a loss for shareholders-in the
form of needlessly increased risk-as well as for capital-consuming com-
panies, and ultimately for the exchanges, which would see less invest-
ment in mature companies than there otherwise might have been.
Aside from the fact that agency costs may differ among companies of
various sizes and maturities, coercive tender offers are far more threaten-
ing to smaller, growing companies, which are less actively traded and
which, because of their smaller size, are more susceptible to being oper-
ated as a captive subsidiary. Shareholders in such companies are not
only likely to differ more in their opinions of what constitutes an ade-
quate offer-since the market for their stock is presumably somewhat
less efficient-but they also justifiably fear the consequences of a partial
bid and are thus more likely to tender early for what they perceive as a
less attractive offer than a shareholder in a large company. In short, rule
19c-4 likely would disserve smaller companies and eradicate whatever
positive attraction alternative exchanges may have had.
So why would the NYSE seek to have the SEC impose a uniform rule
on all exchanges that might be appropriate only for the NYSE? The
fairly obvious answer is that the SEC's governmental authority was a
way for the NYSE to protect itself from competition and, incidentally, to
119. Gilson thus concludes that an optimal rule would allow companies to start out with multi-
class capitalization but would preclude companies which are already publicly held from recapitaliz-
ing. Id.; Adopting Release, supra note 54, at 89,215- 19; Proposing Release, supra note 53, at
88,777-80. In all fairness, the SEC recognized the possibility of legitimate business purposes for
multi-class capitalization. Adopting Release, supra note 54, at 89,215-19; Proposing Release, supra
note 53, at 88,780. Thus, the rule adopted was essentially what Professor Gilson recommended.
The problem, of course, is that it can be difficult to predict the most desirable structure at the
organizational or initial public offering stage. Most companies would therefore opt for dual class
structure even though they might be better off with a single class, if for no other reason than lack of
an option to undo the latter. Similarly, management would likely be reluctant ever to propose a
recapitalization to eliminate a dual class structure. The net effect of the rule then would likely have
been to increase the risk of single class capitalization to the point that no one would ever opt for it.
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put competing exchanges at a disadvantage. Rule 19c-4 was, in short,
the result of what has been called "rent-seeking" by the NYSE. 2 ' That
is, rather than face up to the need to make a decision that might or might
not give it a competitive edge, the Exchange sought to have the SEC
prohibit competition with respect to the voting rights component of list-
ing standards.
Assuming for the moment that the exchanges were doing their job,
what might a scheme of exchange-administered takeover regulation look
like? One possible mode of variable regulation entails determining the
percentage of stock ownership required to control any given company.
Companies with a control percentage above some cut-off figure would be
subject to anticoercion rules, while those below would not. Such a
scheme poses the obvious problem that any cut-off is somewhat arbitrary.
Moreover, determining eacfi company's control percentage is likely to be
quite speculative. And the scheme would no doubt generate a multitude
of strategies designed to take advantage of it. Given these difficulties, the
most likely way to set up a dual system of regulation based on control
percentages would seem to be through the stock exchanges.
Of course, a more flexible listing category system arguably would leave
investors in largely the same position as currently, since it would merely
substitute exchange-level decisions as to, say, appropriate defensive
measures, for decisions now made by boards of directors. That argument
misses the point, however. If the exchanges are regarded as trustworthy
regulators of defensive tactics, investors need never bear the expense of
determining precisely which defenses a company has adopted. In short,
it is at least possible to have the benefits of standardization without suf-
fering its confinement if some reputational intermediary can be installed.
Specifically, the exchanges could determine, through the quasi-admin-
istrative, self-regulatory process, which companies to subject to a particu-
lar tender offer scheme. Each exchange could effect the proposed system
by establishing two classes of listings. Indeed, there is no reason why
more than two categories could not be established, each offering a differ-
ent package of tender offer rules. More restrictive tender offer rules
would apply to smaller, riskier companies, and less stringent rules would
apply to larger, more established companies. In many ways, a scheme of
multitiered exchange regulation, if wholly voluntary, would differ little
from present law. As things stand, companies are largely free to adopt a
120. See Romano, supra note 60.
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wide variety of advance defenses that have the effect of eliminating the
threat of partial and two-tier bids. Nevertheless, stock exchange regula-
tion would likely provide an improvement. The reason, again, is stand-
ardization. The current absence of rules forces investors to do
considerable research to determine what kinds of defenses are appropri-
ate for a particular company, as well as what kinds of defenses a com-
pany has in place. Once the latter determination is made, the investor
has no assurance that the company will not adopt additional ordifferent
defenses. In the end, then, investors probably treat most companies as if
they have the full complement of defenses. The company that declines to
adopt them all thus enjoys no advantage in the market. It must pay as
much for capital as the most heavily defended company, even though its
management willingly exposes itself to greater discipline.
Additional stock exchange regulation-even an essentially voluntary,
self-categorizing scheme--could change all this. Aside from reducing in-
formation costs for shareholders, exchange regulations would act as a
coordinating agent or catalyst for management. While under the current
regulatory scheme, management gains little by failing to install shark
repellents, if a stock exchange reserved a listing category for fully-ex-
posed companies, it would be far less costly for any one company to
forgo advance defenses. By associating itself with other similar compa-
nies in the competition for public capital, the fully-exposed company pre-
sumably would enjoy the most attractive terms. Of course, some sort of
restriction on a company's switching quickly from one category to an-
other would be necessary. For example, the switch might be allowed
only after a shareholder vote, and the exchange might even require the
subject company to include a requirement for such a vote in its articles of
incorporation. Without some such assurance, the categories would be no
better than the current system since investors would assume that a com-
pany threatened with a takeover would switch.
Undoubtedly, some danger exists that companies without any real
need for it will choose a more protective scheme of regulation. The dan-
ger may not be all that significant, however. Practically speaking, a com-
pany might be compelled to join a particular category. If investors care
about takeover premiums, they will care about a company's listing cate-
gory. A mature company that chooses the more restrictive scheme
designed for growth companies might find the price of its stock de-
pressed, and its cost of capital elevated. Moreover, at least in theory,
causing the company to pay more than necessary for capital could consti-
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tute waste, rendering management personally liable. 21
In summary, the idea behind a scheme of exchange regulation of
tender offers is not so much to enforce more rigorous or even different
rules, but rather to provide clear standardized choices that will act as
focal points for both management and investors. The contemplated
stock exchange rules would serve simply as a catalyst: something around
which listed companies could congregate. A system of stock exchange
categories would do little directly to increase or decrease the array of
possible defenses a company could adopt. Rather, it would simply allow
for grouping defenses into identifiable packages with recognizable costs
and benefits. It would also give the company that chooses exposure some
assurance that it would not be alone, that its exposure would not go un-
recognized, and that the potential benefits of its choice would be realized.
It seems clear that regulating the tender offer process through the me-
dium of stock exchange rules makes a good deal of sense. But what will
prompt the exchanges to adopt appropriate and differing tender offer reg-
ulations? The question is particularly pertinent given the events that led
to the adoption of rule 19c-4. The NYSE was understandably concerned
that by retaining its one-share one-vote rule it might drive away current
and potential listings. 2 2 After all, an exchange is a business as well as a
self-regulatory organization. Competition for listings is fierce. More-
over, other exchanges had declined to adopt rules similar to the NYSE
rule. 123
The NYSE's fear of losing business, however, may have been over-
blown. The old one-share, one-vote rule arguably reduced information
costs and risk and increased liquidity in connection with the least risky
stocks. The fact that the rule might compel some issuers to forgo listing
is not necessarily dispositive: repeal of the rule may have driven other
issuers away. If, in fact, the rule reduces information costs and risk and
increases liquidity, issuers who do not highly value the flexibility of un-
listed status will probably seek another trading medium that offers the
121. See, e.g.., Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 896 (2d Cir. 1982) (bank directors may be held liable
for making loan at inadequate interest rate given risk of project being financed), cert. denied, 460
U.S. 1051 (1983). See also Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). But see Paramount
Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989).
122. See Adopting Release, supra note 54, at 89,217; Proposing Release, supra note 53, at
88,770, 88,775.
123. See Adopting Release, supra note 54, at 89,209-10, 89,217; Proposing Release, supra note
53, at 88,770, 88,775. It should be noted that the NYSE had attempted to persuade other exchanges
to adopt a uniform rule. Id. at 88,771.
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benefits of such a risk-reducing rule. Or indeed, the least risky compa-
nies might not offer their shares publicly at all if forced to bear a cost of
capital increased by the takeover fears of risky companies seeking stock
exchange protection. This is not to say that every exchange or other
trading medium should necessarily adopt similar rules. Indeed, from the
viewpoint of the NYSE, if such rules were universally imposed, it would
no longer be the exchange of choice for the least risky issuers. The opti-
mal solution, at least from the point of view of the market as a whole,
may be different exchanges for companies with different characteristics,
which, of course, is what has traditionally been the case. Though again it
bears noting, however, that the Exchange need not have risked losing
much, if any, business if it had adopted a voluntary two-tier listing
system.
The objection of exchanges, which for one reason or another appear to
have lost sight of their self interest, may simply preclude the SEC from
imposing such a scheme. It may not be possible legally to force one ex-
change to adopt a rule without forcing all to do so if indeed the latter is
even legal. This limitation argues in favor of self-regulation with greater
flexibility and less ties to notions of due process and equal protection.
That is, if a sufficiently flexible legal rule is not capable of being devised,
then maybe the problem is that the subject is not appropriate for legal
regulation. The real question now is when does the SEC have the au-
thority to review, much less mandate, exchange rules? The Business
Roundtable case clearly says that the Commission has limited authority
over stock exchange listing standards and, indeed, all stock exchange
rules. Practically speaking, the effect of this uncertainty may be limited
since the exchanges may well continue to come to the Commission rou-
tinely for approval of rule changes. 24
Whatever else it might also be in the eyes of the law- private club,
public utility, or natural monopoly-a stock exchange is a business. By
giving the exchanges the authority to establish listing standards, we give
them something like a property right that can be bought and sold. That
right engenders competition, or at least allows it to arise. It might be
124. The case also calls into question the Commission's authority in connection with control
over the products that are allowed to be traded on an exchange. See, e.g., Chicago Mercantile Ex-
change v. SEC, 883 F.2d 537 (7th Cir. 1989). It should be noted that the American Stock Exchange
has now adopted (subject to SEC approval) a new listing rule consistent with its earlier rule that will
allow many forms of multi-class capitalization that are currently prohibited on the NYSE and on
NASDAQ's National Market System. See Norris, AMEXRule of Supervoting, N.Y. Times, Apr. 12,
1991, at D8, col. 3.
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argued that when the law, through the imposition of significant regula-
tion, has impressed a trust of sorts on certain business activities, it
amounts to the waste of a public good to give up jurisdiction. Compel-
ling as that argument may be however in connection with, say, national
parks, establishing property rights, whether in free or previously regu-
lated goods is a perfectly legitimate function of the law and indeed per-
haps one of its higher functions. 125
CONCLUSION
Did all this destroy takeovers? Probably not. But taken in combina-
tion with the campaign against insider trading, the razing of Drexel
Burnham, and the lynching of Michael Milken, it was certainly a factor.
Nevertheless, the campaign to federalize corporation law, which seemed
like such a good idea fifteen years ago, now looks like utter folly. Con-
gress has proven itself unable to cope with issues of corporate control.
And to say the least, the SEC has not fared well in recent years in its role
as champion of the takeover. Meanwhile, the states, particularly Dela-
ware, and the courts have demonstrated remarkable resilience and, in-
deed, creativity in dealing with contests for corporate control. It seems,
in short, as if federalism works.
125. The reason is the same one that explains why whales are scarce and chickens are not, even
though chickens are consumed at a far greater rate. Ironically, the 1975 amendments to the Ex-
change Act strongly suggest that Congress believed the stock exchanges to be a sort of public trust.
For example, section 11 prohibits any member of an exchange from using a seat to trade primarily
for his or her own account.
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